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We discuss formal ontologies where objects can be ranked according to the
modes of existence they are associated with. Mathematical objects, for in-
stance, may be ranked according to how admissible they are; it is natural
to consider the positive integers more admissible than the very large cardi-
nals, for example. We also give a resource conscious interpretation of the
existential quantifier and investigate systems with formal ontologies in the
resulting resource conscious setting. In this setting a formula ∃xϕ(x) is true
if we have enough resources to construct a witness c for the variable x such
that ϕ(c) holds. The nature of the required resources can be interpreted in
various ways, depending on the system studied.
1 Introduction
In this article we consider a perspective that assigns mathematical objects
different degrees of significance. For example, it might be desirable to as-
sign finite binary strings a higher degree of significance than infinite binary
strings simply because finite ones are physically realizable (at least in prin-
ciple). The aim of the article is to discuss issues related to such perspectives
and to briefly investigate properties of related formal systems. We define
formal ontologies that assign each object of the domain of an ontology a
value in a partially ordered set. An object a with a value higher than that
of another object b is considered in some sense more significant than the
object b. Significance can mean various different things here. In most cases
we define an object a to be more significant than b iff a is more admissible,
in one sense or another, than b. For example, a could be a decidable set and
b a recursively enumerable but not decidable set.
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The point of the article is not to investigate the notion of significance.
The word “significance” is simply an umbrella term that works better or
worse for the systems we define. Perhaps “admissibility” would be a better
term, at least for most of the examples we consider in this article. Admis-
sibility and significance are not wholly unrelated notions. For example one
might put together a computer system where a computer A produces binary
strings that another computer B then reads. For rather obvious reasons, one
might wish to regard outputs of A that are generated after a short period
of computation as more significant than those that would make A run for,
say, 1000 years. When optimizing B, it would be a good choice to take into
account that B is not likely to receive from A strings of the latter variety.
Even though some of the considerations below are philosophical in na-
ture, I do not wish to argue in favor of or against any position in the philos-
ophy of mathematics – institutionalized or not. However, I believe that one
can deepen one’s understanding of mathematics by gaining more insight
into issues arising from considerations related to different perspectives on
the foundations of mathematics. Also, importantly, considerations that may
appear philosophical can often quite justifiably be regarded also as consid-
erations with the objective to design (formal) tools for artificial intelligence
and computer science. Such tools that have their origins in philosophical
considerations are quite numerous indeed, and various industrial applica-
tions exist. Modal logic is a prime example of a field with its origins in
philosophy that has recently found a very wide range of real-life applica-
tions, most of these applications being related to computer science. See [2]
and [3] for example.
In Section 2 below we define a framework for constructing formal ontolo-
gies with degrees of significance. We then discuss a couple of toy-systems
where such an ontology is applied. Within the framework it is relatively
natural to define for example foundation systems for mathematics that take
into account considerations related to the limitations on available physical
resources. Among other things, such considerations seem to motivate var-
ious finitist and ultrafinitist attitudes. Examples 2.2, 2.3 and 3.2 below
briefly elaborate such ideas.
In Section 3 we define a semantics for first-order logic that attempts to
take into account some aspects of considerations related to limitations of
available resources. The idea is to give the existential quantifier a resource
conscious interpretation. Roughly speaking, ∃x ϕ(x) is true if and only if we
have enough resources to construct a witness c for x such that ϕ(c) holds. We
use this new logic to investigate properties of formal ontologies with degrees
of significance. The nature of the resources involved can be interpreted in
different ways, depending on the issues modeled. The formal system we
develop is not supposed to model a single fully specified framework, such
as a foundation system for mathematics. The idea is to investigate issues
related to limitations of available resources from a general point of view,
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and most of the tools defined are only of a tenatative nature.
Logics that take into account issues related to limitations on available
resources have of course been consired before. See [7] for example. And of
course there are various logics that attempt to account for issues related to
different aspects of the notion of constructibility. Intuitionistic logic and the
system considered in [5] are examples of such logics.
When developing formal systems, the background assumptions we base
our approach on are classical.
2 Mathematics and Ontologies with Degrees of
Significance
When putting together a foundation system for mathematics, one natural
approach is to attempt to define the following.
1. A collection of mathematical objects.
2. A language to make assertions about the objects, together with a
suitable semantics for the language.
This is of course only one approach, and radically different approaches may
lead to systems that elucidate some issues much better than systems based
on the above approach. In this article we do not wish to define a foundation
system for mathematics, but we do something that is not wholly unrelated
to such considerations. In this section we define a framework for specifying
formal ontologies whose objects are ranked by assigning them a value in
a partial order. This kind of a device can be used for various different
purposes. For one reason or another, one may wish to consider some object
c as somehow more significant than another object d. In that case the object
c would be assigned a rank greater than that of d. Some other pair of objects
could receive incomparable ranks, perhaps because they are considered to
have modes of existence that are rather different. For example numbers
and proofs could, perhaps, be assigned incomparable ranks. The criteria by
which degrees of significance are assigned can vary; the word “significance”
can mean different things in different applications. Indeed, in one system
the object c could receive a higher degree of signifance the object d, and in
another system a lower one.
After defining the framework for degree ontologies, we discuss a range of
toy-systems that employ such an ontology. In the next section we investigate
these systems using a formal language.
Definition 2.1 (Degree ontologies). Let A = (A,≤) be a partial order, and
let C be a set. Let f : C → A be function. The structure O = (C,A, f) is a
poset valued ontology, or alternatively, a degree ontology. We call f the rank
function of the ontology O.
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We then consider a toy-system that can be motivated by considerations
related to various finitist and ultrafinitist attitudes. Let me repeat that
I do not wish to defend or attack any perspective on the philosophy of
mathematics. The aim here is simply to describe a possible perspective that
is not incoherent. Understanding different approaches to the foundations
of mathematics can increase one’s mathematical capacity, and furthermore,
considerations motivating different kinds of foundations can be useful from
the point of view of real-life applications.
Example 2.2. Let N≥1 denote the set of positive integers and let
R = ( [0, 1], ≤R ),
where ≤R is the usual ordering of the real numbers restricted to the interval
[0, 1]. Define the function f : N≥1 → [0, 1] such that f(x) = 1x . Define the
ontology (N≥1,R, f).
The ontology (N≥1,R, f) models an attitude from which positive inte-
gers become increasingly insignificant as they become greater and greater.
Here the positive integers are in a sense identified with the cardinality they
represent. The larger integers exist out there, but the greater they are, the
less we care about their properties. This kind of an attitude could be related
to a real-life application where one can construct representations of positive
integers encoded in unary. Perhaps the application is a computer system
that allows for the dynamic increase of resources, so there is no clear limit
on the size of integers that could be encountered. However, assume the time
required for the construction of a representation of an integer is roughly pro-
portional to the cardinality of the integer in question. Then it can be quite
natural to adopt the attitude that the significance of integers decreases as
they grow larger and larger. After all, in the real-life use of the system, one
is not likely to encounter the very large integers at all. Of course it could
be the case that, say, the integer 5 occurs much more frequently than 4, and
therefore 5 should perhaps be assigned a much higher degree of significance
than 4. In other words, the desired properties of the rank function depend
very much on the particularities of the system we wish to model, and also
on the set of properties of the system that we want to take into account.
There are various sensible ways of defining a degree ontology for a set of
objects. The ranking of the objects can be based on various diffent kinds of
principles.
Example 2.3. Let C = N ∪ {N}, and let l ∈ N≥1 be a positive integer.
Let R be as in the previous example. Define the function h : C → [0, 1] as
follows.
h(x) =
{
l
x+l if x ∈ N,
0 if x = N.
Define the ontology (C,R, h).
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This example is rather similar to Example 2.2. One novel feature here is
the parameter l. Especially ultrafinitist considerations are often motivated
on the grounds of physical limitations on available resources. For example,
Sazonov’s article [11] takes the number 21000 to be large enough to be ex-
cluded from the list of numbers to be considered. If we define l = 21000, then
the integer 21000 receives the degree 12 of significance. This could be taken
to mean that the degree of existence, whatever that is, of numbers below l
is higher than their degree of non-existence; numbers above l would be con-
sidered more non-existent than existent. The number l = 21000 would strike
a middle ground between these two regions. Finally, the ontology (C,R, h)
assigns the set N the degree 0. This could be taken to mean that the set N
exists but with the degree zero of existence. Perhaps “subsistence” would
be a better term for such a mode of existence.
A funny feature, perhaps, of the above system is that only the number 0
gets assigned the degree 1 of existence. It is, of course, easy to change this
in case one so desires. On various psychological and even historical grounds
one might wish to assign 0 a smaller degree of existence than the degree of,
say, the number 1. It all depends, of course, on what one wishes to model
exactly, and how.
The toy ontologies of Examples 2.3 and 2.4 avoid commitment to there
existing some greatest natural number, for example 21000 − 1, while still
retaining their ultrafinitist character.1 This fact could be one of the strong
points of the attitude modeled by the ontologies defined in the examples.
The systems show the (rather obvious) fact that one does not have to commit
to the existence of the largest natural number in order to entertain the
perspective that in some sense very large numbers are quite inaccessible and
therefore even appear in some sense non-existent. All too often this kind of
a perspective is na¨ıvely assumed to necessarily commit to the existence of
the largest natural number.2
Example 2.4. Consider sets S ⊆ N with the elements s ∈ S represented in
binary. Let N(bin) denote the set of binary representations of the numbers
in N. There are continuum many sets S ⊆ N(bin). Some of these sets S
are rather “tame” in the sense that there is a Turing machine that decides
for each n ∈ N(bin) whether n is in the set in question. However, there
are only ℵ0 many Turing algorithms, so most of the sets S ⊆ N(bin) are
not tame in the above sense. What kind of a status should we assign to a
subset S ⊆ N(bin) that is not Turing-decidable? What kind of an object
is S, if we believe we cannot systematically specify (i.e., decide), even in
principle, which objects n ∈ N(bin) belong to S? Indeed, there seems to be
nothing directly incoherent about adopting the attitude (towards the notion
1Of course, a serious and fully committed radical finitist might not like the fact that
we referred to the set of real numbers in the formulation of the toy-systems.
2For very interesting related considerations, see [8].
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of existence) that this kind of a set does not exist at all. Perhaps a somewhat
more appealing attitude, however, would be that the mode of existence of an
undecicable set is in some sense weaker than that of a decidable set. There
are various natural ways to proceed, of course. For example we could define
an ontology satisfying the following conditions.
1. Decidable sets receive a higher degree of existence than those that are
not decidable.
2. Recursively enumerable but undecidable sets receive a degree of exis-
tence that is somewhere between the degree(s) of existence of decidable
sets and the degree(s) of existence of sets that are not recursively enu-
merable.
Also, it could perhaps be desirable to make the degree of existence of a
set S ⊆ N(bin) depend on other complexity measures, such as complexity
classes of computational complexity theory [9].
Let us then consider the nature of the set Pow(N(bin)) and the degree
of existence of the cardinal ℵ1. There are, of course, only countably many
recursively enumerable sets S ⊆ N(bin). Perhaps it would be natural to
assign the set ℵ1 a degree equal to that of the sets S ⊆ Pow(N(bin)) that
are not recursively enumerable, or perhaps even a lower degree.
Finally, it would be natural to assign finite sets S ⊆ N(bin) higher degrees
of existence than infinite sets. Finite sets could be ranked such that the
smaller finite sets receive higher degrees than larger ones.
The currently paradigmatic practise of doing mathematics within the
framework provided by ZFC also shows an attitude where mathematical
objects have different modes of existence associated with them: mathe-
maticians casually talk about sets and proper classes. Sets are treated as
first-class citizens and proper classes as second-class citizens existing on the
meta-level. Even though one might not wish to characterize sets as somehow
more important than proper classes, sets and proper classes do have different
rights as citizens in the mathematical realm. This practise of distinguish-
ing between sets and proper classes is somewhat analogous to the attitude
described above in Example 2.4 where undecidable sets were assigned the
status of second-class citizens. A carfully defined foundation system where
only decidable sets are considered to exist as object-level objects and unde-
cidable sets receive the status analoguous to that of proper classes, can be
quite natural and well-motivated indeed.
Example 2.5. Let Σ be an alphabet consisting of, say, 30 symbols. The
set Σ could contain for example the English alphabet plus some additional
symbols. Let us define an encryption scheme in order to encrypt finite
strings in Σ∗. Let n be some fixed positive integer large enough so that we
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are happy always sending a message (i.e., a string) with exactly n symbols.
So, we always write messages with n symbols. However, after encryption,
what we actually ultimately send, is a string with exactly 30n symbols. Let
s : {1, ..., n} −→ {1, ..., 30n}
be a sequence without repetition. In other words, s is an injection. Let
u ∈ Σ∗ be a message with n symbols we wish to send. We first fill up a
tape of 30n slots in the following way. We write the first symbol of u to the
slot s(1), the second one to the slot s(2), and so on. The n-th symbol of u
of course goes to the slot s(n). Then we use the remaining 29n slots such
that once we are finished, each of the 30n slots has exactly one symbol in it,
and each symbol in Σ is written in exactly n slots of the tape of 30n slots.
We then send the string on the tape to the receiver. The receiver of course
knows the key s.
Assume there is a code breaker who knows more or less everything there
is to know about us, the receiver and the encryption scheme we use. He
might even know the method we use in order to fill up the tape of 30n
slots after a message with n symbols has been written on it. However, he
does not know s. Assume we never change the key s. Assume also that
the breaker knows that we never change s. The breaker investigates more
and more sent strings with 30n symbols and compares the strings to the
courses of action that we and the receiver take. As he gathers more data,
the breaker begins considering some sequences as more likely key candidates
than others. Some sequences become more significant and important to the
breaker than others. Perhaps he devotes more time and energy to the set of
more significant sequences.
The breaker entertains a degreed ranking system that resembles a degree
ontology. (Of course one might not wish to talk about ontologies in this
case.) The domain of the related formal degree ontology would be the set of
injective sequences mapping {1, ..., n} to {1, ..., 30n}. This could be a rather
large set, or course. The ranking of the breaker’s system evolves as the
breaker analyzes more and more sent strings. It may not always be an easy
task to choose a suitable ranking. For example, it is an interesting question
whether the breaker should consider the sequence t such that t(x) = x for all
x ∈ {1, ..., n} as a rather unlikely sequence even before any messages have
been sent.
It is indeed natural to rank objects according to one’s state of knowledge
and understanding of a system under investigation. Such a ranking then
evolves as one gathers more data and/or obtains a deeper understanding of
the system.
We end the current section by briefly visiting the realm of mythomatics.
Let us first turn our attention to questions concerning issues related to
mathematical realism.
7
Is there a set whose cardinality is strictly between those of the sets N
and R? Does this question make sense? Does the question have a definite
answer that we simply do not know yet? Questions of this kind might arise
in ordinary mathematical work more easily than is often thought. It is easy
to write a sentence of second-order logic that states something along the
following lines.
“There is an infinite N ⊆ D, where D is the domain of the current model,
and for all infinite S ⊆ D, there is a surjective map from S to N . Fur-
thermore, for each infinite T ⊆ D, there is a bijective map from D to T , or
alternatively, there is a bijective map from N to T .”
Now, what is the truth value of this sentence in a model with the domain
R? Do we wish to assign it a third truth value i standing for indeterminate
(rather than unknown)? How exactly do we wish to treat second-order
quantification? Exactly what sort of a collection of objects do we want
second-order quantifiers to range over?
Is the continuum hypothesis true? Do we wish to be realist about the
question and simply say that we do not know the answer to that question,
but there necessarily is an answer in { yes, no} that forces itself upon us?
Perhaps we are not satisfied with such an attitude and therefore decide to
take the problem of vagueness seriously in the case of sets. The “notion” of a
table is useful and partially determined, but there are borderline cases where
we seem to enter the twilight zone, and possibly sometimes there simply is
no one single correct definite answer to the question whether an object is a
table. No matter how natural some notion might seem at first, perhaps there
are cases that cannot be considered to be in any sense fully determined. We
might perhaps even end up in a situation where we feel that some notion
should satisfy some property P , but other individuals have created a different
kind of understanding of the notion in question suggesting that P does not
hold. Perhaps their understanding of the notion in question is very similar
to ours, but not the same. In ZFC we of course have x 6∈ x for all sets x,
but is this necessarily true of our informal conception of a set? Is there any
problem in entertaining two different notions of a set, one for well-founded
sets and another one for non-well-founded ones?
Perhaps one day there appears an argument establishing that in some
reasonable sense the options “CH is true” and “CH is not true” are equally
natural. It is not uncommon in the practise of mathematics that one fiddles
about with a collection of reasonably well understood but not fully specified
objects, and when faced with a choice whether the objects should satisfy
some property, there is no obvious single correct way to go. However, it
also seems possible that one day there appears a reasonably convincing ar-
gument establishing that the continuum hypothesis does have a truth value
in {yes, no}. Perhaps that argument even establishes which one of the two
truth values the hypothesis has. Why should the continuum hypothesis not
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have a definite truth value? The fact that the continuum hypothesis is in-
dependent of ZFC does not seem to definitely imply that the hypothesis is
somehow vague. After all, why should any first-order axiomatization of a
binary relation provide a good enough framework for specifying what sets
are?
Maybe all we wish to say about the continuum hypothesis is that perhaps
it has a truth value in { yes, no} that forces itself upon us, and perhaps not.
After all, some brilliant guys seem to say that the continuum hypothesis has
a determinate truth value,3 and some equally brilliant guys seem to say that
continuum hypothesis is a vague statement.4 The (possibly vague) question
about vagueness of the continuum hypothesis is interesting. And of course
vagueness of the notion of vagueness is interesting too...
Assume we want to put such considerations aside and simply consider
the description “X is a set whose cardinality is strictly between those of N
and R”. Let us assume we are happy about not forming an opinion about
whether such a set exists and whether the question about its existence even
makes sense. We might wish to define for ourselves an ontology, possibly a
provisional one, where such sets exist even though we know that perhaps in
the future we might have to seriously revise our views. It would, then, be
quite natural to assign to those exotic entities a lower degree of existence
than to objects to whose existence we have a high degree of commitment
to. A degree ontology seems to work relatively fine here. Of course if we
wished to define a formal degree ontology within the framework provided by
ZFC, the way to go could be to let the objects in the domain of the ontology
corresponding to the exotic entities be encodings of some sort, perhaps some
rather familiar sets.
Let us dig deeper into the mythomatical realm. Philosophers of mathe-
matics often discuss the so called Russell Set, i.e., the “set of all sets that are
not members of themselves” familiar from na¨ıve set theory. It is of course
natural to adopt the attitude that this entity is not an object at all despite
the fact that we have even given it a proper name. After all, this set seems to
satisfy a contradiction. However, one is also free to entertain the perspective
that, indeed, such objects as the Russell Set and perhaps a round square
exist,5 at least as objects of thought or reflection. The Russell Set has a de-
scription associated with it, and we can reflect on the description. However,
it would be quite natural to admit that an object of thought that satisfies
a contradiction should be associated with a weaker degree of existence than
an object that does not satisfy a contradiction. (And, of course, one might
not wish to use the term “existence” here at all.) Finally, one might wish
3See the assertion attributed to Cohen at the beginning of Chapter 11 of [4].
4See Feferman’s article in [6].
5Here some word other than “exist” could perhaps be a much better choice. For
example, one encounters the term “absistence” in discussions related to the thought of
Alexius Meinong.
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to call the Russell Set a concept or an entity rather than an object. After
all, it is a somewhat weird object. Perhaps one would wish to characterize
such objects as having an intension but no extension associated with them.
This kind of an ontology might not be that strange and useless after all.
For example, in a proof by contradiction we may provisionally talk about,
say, the greatest prime number p. (Assume we do this without any radical
ultrafinitist overtones.) It then makes sense to talk about all primes smaller
than p. However, does it make sense to talk about all circles smaller than
p? In some sense contradictory “objects” can be thought to have some
properties and lack others. Ontologies with such entities could be useful for
some purpose. Again, if we wished to define a formal degree ontology with
contradictory objects, an easy way out could be to let the objects in the
domain of the formal ontology that correspond to contradictory objects be
encodings of some sort. For example they could be sets that encode formulae
that describe the contradictory objects.
The idea of a contradictory object might seem weird at first, but is
there really anything very deep about such a conception? Is there any real
problem in employing such a conception?
3 A Logic for Models with a Degree Ontology
In this section we define a semantics for first-order logic that attempts to
take into account aspects behind attitudes that assign different degrees of
significance to different objects. There are, of course, various other ways
of defining systems of formal logic that model such attitudes, and I do
not wish to claim that the system we define in this section is particularly
canonical. The objective of the section is simply to introduce a tentative
system of logic that with some degree of naturality models at least some
aspects of the phenomena related to degrees of significance. The main idea
behind the system is to give the existential quantifier a resource conscious
reading. Roughly, the sentence ∃x(Px) is true if we have enough resources
to construct (a representation of) an object that has the property P . The
reader is free to replace the symbol ∃ with, say, C, if (s)he does not like the
connotation that existence is somehow strongly related to the possibility of
constructing an object. I do not wish to defend (or attack) such a view.
Let V be a vocabulary containing relation symbols only. Let FOV denote
the set of first-order V -formulae. Let A be a first-order V -model with the
domain A, and let f : A −→ R≥0 be a function. Here R≥0 denotes the set
of non-negative real numbers. Let r ∈ R≥0 and ϕ ∈ FOV . Let VAR be
a countably infinite set of first-order variable symbols. Let U ⊆ VAR and
let v : U −→ A be a variable assignment function. Note that the set U is
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allowed be finite, even empty. If a ∈ A and x ∈ VAR, we define
v[x 7→ a] =
{(
v \ { (x, v(x))}) ∪ {(x, a)} if x ∈ Dom(v),
v ∪ {(x, a)} if x 6∈ Dom(v).
We define truth of FOV formulae with respect to objects of the type
(A, f, r, v). Intuitively, the function f assigns each object a ∈ A a cost
f(a) ∈ R≥0, which is the amount of resources needed in order to construct
the object a, or perhaps a representation of a. The number r ∈ R≥0 denotes
the amount of resources available. The range Ran(v) of the variable assign-
ment v is the collection of objects that we already have constructed.6 The
variable symbols in Dom(v) are the the names (or pointers, if you like) that
we have assigned to the objects in Ran(v). We call the objects of the type
(A, f, r, v) resource interpretations.
If ψ is an atomic formula, we define
(A, f, r, v) |= ψ iff A, v |= ψ.
We choose to give the Boolean connectives the classical interpretation. How-
ever, we define
(A, f, r, v
) |= ∃x(ϕ(x))
if and only if at least one of the following conditions is satisfied.
1. ∃a ∈ (A\Ran(v))(r−f(a) ≥ 0 and (A, f, r−f(a), v[x 7→ a]) |= ϕ(x)).
2. ∃a ∈ Ran(v)
( (
A, f, r, v[x 7→ a]) |= ϕ(x) ).
The quantifier ∃x could be understood to assert something along the
following lines.
“There exists an object, call it x, such that we can first construct a repre-
sentation of the object and then observe that...”
Notice that by the latter satisfaction clause for the existential quantifier, if
we already have a representation of an object, we do not have to consume
any more resources in order to construct a new representation for it. The
old one will do.7
We consider a few examples that illustrate the properties of the logic.
6There are cases where this intuition is not exactly correct, however, as we shall see.
7Quantification of variables already in the domain of the variable assignment function
problematizes this intuition, however. Evaluating the formula
∃x(Px ∧ ∃x(¬Px ∧ ∃x(Px)))
in a suitable resource interpretation should directly illustrate the issue. Notice the nested
quantification of the same variable in the formula. If we construct an element a, tag it
with x, and then construct some other element b and use x to tag b, we loose the free
access to a. The element a does not have our tag on it any more.
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Example 3.1. Let P and Q be unary relation symbols and consider the
model A = (A,PA, QA), where PA and QA are non-empty subsets of the
domain A such that PA ∩ QA = ∅. Let f(a) = f(b) = 100. We have
(A, f, 150, ∅) |= ∃x(Px) ∧ ∃y(Qy).
Notice, however, that
(A, f, 150, ∅) 6|= ∃x∃y(Px ∧Qy).
In the standard first-order setting, the two sentences are of course equivalent.
The domain A of the model A in the above example could be, for exam-
ple, the set of items in a shop, and r could be the amount of money we have.
PA could be the set of shirts and QA the set of ties. The function f would
simply give the prize of the items in A. The sentence ∃x(Px)∧∃y(Qy) would
then correctly assert that we have enough money to buy a shirt and we also
have enough money to buy a tie. However, this time we would not be able
to buy both a shirt and a tie. The fact that the sentence ∃x∃y(Px ∧Qy) is
not satisfied reflects this sad state of affairs.
In Example 2.2 we defined an ontology where the degree of significance of
a natural number depended on its cardinality. We now consider an example
related to this kind of an attitude.
Example 3.2. Define the cost function g : N≥1 → R≥0 such that g(x) = x.
Here the amount of resources it takes to construct a representation of a
positive integer is the cardinality the integer represents. The cost function g
could quite naturally give rise to the ontology (N≥1,R, f) defined in Example
2.2. The degree of significance of a positive integer assigned by f is inversely
proportional to the cost given by g. Our resource conscious interpretation
of first-order logic captures some quite interesting features related to these
kinds of the ultrafinitist attitudes. Let N = (N≥1, PN, QN, SN), where
1. PN = {2},
2. QN = {2600 − 1},
3. SN = {2600}.
Let r = 2600 and call M = (N, g, r, ∅). We have
M |= ∃x(Sx).
However,
M 6|= ∃x∃y(Px ∧Qx).
The state of affairs here resembles the situation in the previous example. We
can just construct a representation for the number 2600 within the systemM.
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We can also construct a representation for each smaller number. However,
we cannot construct representations for 2600 − 1 and 2 and have them exist
simultaneously. Similar phenomena are quite common indeed; being able to
feed a village of 100 people does not imply that you can feed two villages of
90 people each.
Example 3.3. Let us define the model S = (S,RS), where S = Dom(S)
is a set of finite binary strings and RS ⊆ S × S a binary relation. Assume
we are modeling a computer system where each file requires some kind of
a support file in order for the system to work correctly. Let the set S
correspond to a set of files, and define the relation RS such that RS(x, y)
if and only if y is a support file of x. Let f : S −→ R≥0 be a function such
that for each u ∈ S, f(u) denotes the amount of memory that u requires.
Let r ∈ R≥0 be the amount of memory available. The first-order sentence
∀x∃y(Rxy) can be seen as a kind of a safety specification asserting that if
we can store a file x, then there remains enough memory for a support file
y of x. Here ∀x stands for ¬∃x¬. Assume that we have
(S, f, r, ∅) |= ∀x∃y(Rxy).
Now, there could exist a file s ∈ S that does not have support file associated
with it it all, but the system cannot store s in the first place (i.e., f(s) > r),
and therefore s poses no problem to us. The safety specification asserts that
whatever we can store, we can also support.
Recall the sentence ∃x∃y(Px ∧ Qy) that was not satisfied by the re-
source interpretation (A, f, 150, ∅) defined in Example 3.1. We can make
the sentence true by increasing the amount of available resources: for ex-
ample (A, f, 200, ∅) satisfies the sentence. Consider then the sentence ϕ =
∀x∃y(Rxy) encountered in Example 3.3. It is easy to define a model A and
a cost function f : Dom(A) −→ R≥0 such that the resource interpretation
(A, f, r, ∅) does not satisfy ϕ, no matter how large the amount r ∈ R≥0 is
made. These considerations motivate the following observations.
Proposition 3.4. An existential first-order sentence of a relational vocab-
ulary is satisfiable by some resource interpretation iff it is satisfiable in the
standard first-order sense.
Proposition 3.5. The following holds if and only if we are investigating a
finite model A. For each first-order sentence ϕ of a relational vocabulary the
following are equivalent.
1. For each cost function f : Dom(A) −→ R≥0, there exists an amount
r ∈ R≥0 of resources such that (A, f, r, ∅) |= ϕ.
2. A |= ϕ in the standard first-order sense.
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In most cases when a formal system is defined, it is too easy to point out
features that perhaps appear undesirable or strange. We identify sentences
that are satisfiable in the resource conscious setting even though when giving
them the standard first-order reading, they are certainly not satisfiable.
Perhaps some of the strangeness here is due to the decision to keep the
symbols ∃ and ∀ in our language. For example, the sentence ∀x(x 6= x)
is satisfied by any resource interpretation where each object has a non-zero
cost, the amount of available resources is zero, and the variable assignment is
empty. Of course the sentence can also be satisfied in the ordinary first-order
sense if one allows for models with the empty domain to exist. However,
also the sentence
∃x∃y(x 6= y) ∧ ∃x∀y(x = y)
is easily seen to be satisfiable. It is also possible to define a resource in-
terpretation that satisfies the sentence ∀x∃y(Rxy), but not the sentence
∃z∀x∃y(Rxy).
We defined our system such that determining the truth of an atomic
formula consumes no resources whatsover. This was done mainly for the
sake of simplicity. One could, of course, wish to consider a system where
checking the truth of an atom also consumes available resources. Also, we
restricted our attention to languages with a relational vocabulary. With a
function symbol s, one can write terms of the type s(x). It may happen
that the interpretation of s(x) is an element whose construction consumes a
large amount of resources even though the construction of x consumes very
little. This could, perhaps, be an undesirable feature. One can of course
always attempt to alter the semantics of a formal system in order to deal
with undesirable features. Here, however, I have wished to keep the picture
simple. After all, these investigations should be regarded as tentative in
nature.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have defined a framework for specifying formal ontologies where objects
are ranked according to how significant we consider them. Such ontologies
can be used for various different kinds of purposes. For instance, we have
toyed with an ultrafinitist ontology where the degree of existence of the
positive integers decreases as they get greater and greater. We have also
defined an alternative interpretation of the existential quantifier that reflects
attitudes related to such degree ontologies, and investigated the properties
of the resulting logic.
As it always seems to be the case with articles similar in character to
this paper, it is probably rather easy to identify incoherencies and dubious
implicit assumptions from the ideas presented, and various more natural
approaches to the problems considered undoubtedly exist. The aim of this
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article, however, has not been to search for a single canonical approach to
any of the issues discussed. Instead, the approach in the article has been
tentative in nature. Indeed, perhaps a more natural approach for example to
modeling intuitions that lead to ultrafinitist considerations would build on
some kind of a fuzzy identity such that from some large number n onwards,
numbers are regarded in some sense increasingly identical. Indeed, this idea
seems to have some psychological motivation to it. For example think of
two heaps of sand, one having some large number n of grains and the other
one n + 1 grains. For investigations along such lines, some kind of a fuzzy
logic (see [1],[10]) could turn out to be a natural choice if the use of a formal
language was desired.
Questions related to the role of resources have, of course, received a lot of
well-deserved attention in various fields of computer science. Unfortunately,
however, such issues have attracted relatively little attention from people
working on the foundations and philosophy of mathematics. This is likely
to change in the future. There is no harm in developing formal systems that
model different kinds of perspectives on the foundational issues in mathe-
matics. In the best case, the process of developing such systems can lead to
discoveries that significantly elucidate the nature of mathematics and have
direct industrial value.
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